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Recalls of meat, poultry and processed eggs 
occur under the supervision of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (FSIS). Typically, meat 
and poultry products that have already been 
shipped and distributed into the market and 
are suspected of being potentially hazardous 
to public health, are voluntarily recalled by 
firms either by their own initiative or at the 
request of FSIS. A recall can occur for many 
different reasons including: foodborne illness 
outbreaks; products contaminated with 
foreign materials; mislabeling; undeclared 
allergens; underprocessed or undercooked 
products. 
From 1994 to 2013 FSIS reported almost 
1,300 meat and poultry recalls, representing 
approximately 638 million lb. of product. 
Nearly three-fourths of the recalls correspond 
to the most severe class of recalls (see box). 
Such recalls come at the expense of the firms 
directly involved and can generate substantial 
economic losses. 
As a preventive measure, food firms 
invest substantial resources to reduce the 
probability of food safety hazards. However, 
determining optimal investment is elusive 
because food contamination incidents are 
difficult to predict and even more, their 
probable economic impact is unknown. 
Assessing the economic impact that may 
result from a food recall entails a thorough 
understanding of the costs incurred by firms. 
However, direct measurement of a firm’s 
total costs and losses of revenue requires 
firm-level data that are not generally 
available. To overcome this limitation, we 
analyzed price reactions in financial markets 
during the period surrounding recall events. 
We expect the effects of a food recall would 
be rapidly reflected in stock market prices.  
As such, the magnitude of stock price 
reactions represents the expected costs 
incurred by the implicated firms. This 
magnitude of stock market reactions can be 
FSIS Recall Classification  
The most severe class of recalls are Class I. 
Class I recalls involve a “situation where 
there is a reasonable probability that the use 
of the product will cause serious, adverse 
health consequences or death.” For example, 
these recalls involve meat products 
contaminated with foodborne bacteria such 
as Escherichia coli O157:H7, Listeria 
monocytogenes or Salmonella. 
Class II recalls involve a “situation where 
there is a remote probability of adverse health 
consequences from the use of the product.” 
For example, a Class II recall is issued when 
products contain small amounts of 
undeclared allergens typically associated 
with milder human reactions. 
The least severe class of recalls are Class 
III. These recalls involve a “situation where 
the use of the product will not cause adverse 
health consequences.” For example, a Class 
III recall may involve products that contain 
excess water. 
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used to assess the benefits of implementing 
new technologies or food safety protocols, 
and also, adoption of industry food safety 
management systems (Salin and Hooker, 
2001). 
 
Meat and Poultry Recalls from Publicly 
Traded Firms 
FSIS issued a total of 1,271 recalls from 
January 1994 to December 2013. Among 
these, we identified 163 recalls from 31 
different publicly traded firms. The recalls 
involve beef, pork, chicken, turkey and other 
miscellaneous meat products, consisting of a 
large selection ranging from meat products 
such as ground beef or sausage, to products 
where meat is only one of many ingredients 
such as pizza or soup. Products recalled come 
in different package presentations and are 
sold raw, cooked or ready-to-eat. 
Recalls from publicly traded firms 
account for almost 45% of the total amount 
of product recalled during the past two 
decades, about 278 million lb. For publicly 
traded companies, 115 recalls were Class I, 
39 Class II, and 9 Class III. Table 1 
summarizes the number of recalls by publicly 
traded firms. ConAgra, Sara Lee and Thorn 
Apple Valley realized almost 70% of the total 
product volume recalled by publicly traded 
firms, whereas ConAgra and Tyson Foods 
represented 36% of the recalls. Tyson Foods, 
with the largest number of recalls at 35, is not 
the company that recalled the largest amount 
of product having just under 5 million lb. 
recalled. Sara Lee had the largest product 
volume recalled with nearly 38 million lb. 
across 13 recall events. 
 
Stock Price Reactions 
We quantified the impact of meat and poultry 
recalls on the market value of firms by 
obtaining a measure of abnormal returns – the 
stock price movement associated with each 
specific recall.  First, using daily stock price 
data for the 31 public firms in our sample, we 
calculated actual stock price returns. Then, 
abnormal returns were calculated as the 
difference between actual stock price returns, 
observed during the recall event, and 
predicted stock price returns, expected when 
there had not been a recall event. Next, 
abnormal returns were aggregated across 
time and recall events to estimate the overall 
impact of meat and poultry recalls on stock 
price returns. This measure is known as 
cumulative average abnormal returns  
 
(CAAR). Table 2 reports the typical 
cumulative stock price reactions following a 
recall, as a measure of CAAR, for all recalls 
and just for Class I recalls.  Results are 
presented for the day of the recall 
announcement (day 0) and up to 20 trading 
days after the recall event. 
The “All Recalls” column of Table 2 
illustrates the typical food recall impact on  
Table 1. Summary of Meat and Poultry Recalls 
from Publicly Traded Firms by Firm, 1994-2013. 
 
Ticker Company No. Pounds 
AHP American Home Products 1 150,000  
BOBE Bob Evans Farms Inc. 1 8,500  
CAG ConAgra Inc. 24 114,669,426  
COST Costco Wholesale Corp. 4 222,123  
CPB Campbell Soup Co. 9 16,322,137  
DEG The Delhaize Group 1 Undetermined 
DLM Del Monte Foods Co. 1 31,650  
GIS General Mills Inc. 1 3,300,000  
HAIN The Hain Celestial Group 1 983,700  
HFI Hudson Foods Inc. 5 28,313,959  
HNZ Heinz H. J. Co. 3 94,886  
HRL Hormel Foods Corp. 6 234,946  
IBP IBP Inc. 5 1,160,355  
K Kellogg Co. 1 2,790  
KFT Kraft Foods Inc. 5 28,508  
KR Kroger Co. 3 490,131  
NSRGY Nestle SA 13 1,689,393  
PPC Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. 4 28,806,600  
SAFM Sanderson Farms Inc. 1 Undetermined 
SFD Smithfield Foods Inc. 13 1,007,821  
SJM Smucker J. M. Co. 1 3,000  
SLE Sara Lee Corp. 13 37,723,229  
SVU Supervalu Inc. 2 962  
SYY Sysco Corp. 1 16,800  
TAVI Thorn Apple Valley Inc. 2 35,009,936  
THS TreeHouse Foods Inc. 3 214,957  
TSN Tyson Foods Inc. 35 4,854,233  
UVV Universal Corp. 1 578,000  
WFM Whole Foods Market Inc. 1 1,275  
WIN Winn Dixie Stores Inc. 1 1,734,002  
WMK Weis Markets Inc. 1 2,852  
Total  163 277,656,171  
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day zero (recall announcement day) and after. 
This impact is negative, however, it takes 4 
days after the recall event for stock prices to 
react in a statistically significant way, 
suggesting that the stock market does not 
systematically react immediately to all 
recalls. Regardless of the recall class, stock 
returns decreased, on average, 0.63% within 
5 days after the recall event. Stock price 
reactions after Class I recalls are larger, in 
absolute value, as expected since these recalls 
pose the most human health threat. For 
example, by day 5 (5 days after the recall 
announcement) stock returns decreased on 
average 1.15% after a Class I recall. This 
means that the average firm in our sample, 
with 472 million shares of stock outstanding 
and a $20 per share value on the day of a 
recall announcement, realized a reduced 
value of approximately $109 million in 
market equity 5 days after a recall event.  
Recognize, some firms realized larger losses 
and some realized smaller losses, the results 
in Table 2 are averages across firms and 
recall events. Class II and Class III recalls did 
not have statistically significant stock price 
impacts, suggesting that stock markets tend 
to only react adversely to Class I recalls likely 
because of the health risk involved. These 
findings are consistent with Thomsen and 
Mckenzie (2001).  Figure 1 shows the overall 
impact of all recalls and Class I recalls in the 
stock market. Price reactions seem to be 
persistent over time. 
 
Explaining Stock Price Reactions 
Critical to prudent investment decisions  
targeted at reducing product recall 
probabilities and designing mitigation 
Table 2. Cumulative Stock Price Reactions 
following a Meat and Poultry Recall (% change 
in stock price associated with the recall). 
Day All Recalls Class I 
0 -0.01  -0.08  
1 -0.10  -0.27 * 
2 -0.10  -0.36 * 
3 -0.29  -0.67 * 
4 -0.52 * -1.05 * 
5 -0.63 * -1.15 * 
10 -0.34 ** -1.09 * 
15 -0.37  -0.91 * 
20 -1.05 * -1.64 * 
* Indicates that the magnitude is statistically lower than 
zero at the 0.10 level. 
Figure 1. Average Impact of Meat and Poultry Recall in the Stock Market. 
Event Timeline (days)
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strategies during such events is 
understanding what factors drive the 
magnitude of impact of meat and poultry 
recalls. Several factors have the potential to 
influence this magnitude of impact. For 
instance, the seriousness of the human health 
risk associated with the event may impact 
shareholder losses. Moreover, firms recalling 
a large volume of product would be expected 
to be impacted more than those experiencing 
a small-volume recall. The extent of media 
information accompanying a recall event can 
decrease consumer demand for the 
implicated product (Piggott and Marsh, 2004; 
Schlenker and Villas-Boas, 2009). Therefore, 
media information can also help explain 
stock price reactions. 
Firm size, scale of operations and levels 
of diversification may also influence how 
firm valuation changes in the midst of a food 
safety breach. Larger, more diversified firms 
are expected to be more able to weather a 
food safety recall than small companies. 
Additionally, a firm’s past experience 
managing recalls can influence the outcome 
from contamination incidents on the market 
value of firms (Salin and Hooker, 2001; 
Wang et al., 2002). That is, firms undertaking 
an effective food safety crisis management 
strategy may help minimize stock market 
reactions.  
A description of factors used to explain 
stock price reactions is presented in Table 3. 
Factors are divided into two groups: those 
directly related to the recall event or the firm 
issuing the recall and control factors used to 
predict stock returns behavior. 
Using statistical models we estimated the 
relationship between each one of these 
factors and the magnitude of impact of meat 
and poultry recalls, expressed as CAAR.  
Table 4 presents the marginal effect of each 
factor on stock price reactions 5, 10 and 15 
days after the recall announcement. Focusing 
on factors that are statistically significant at 
standard levels, Recall Size has a negative 
impact on stock returns, holding everything 
else constant. The importance of this factor 
increases over time following a recall 
announcement.  On average, when the size of 
a recall increases by 170%, compared with 
the average recall in our sample of 42,000 lb., 
stock returns become more negative ranging 
from -0.27% to -0.42%. 
Firm Size indicates that on average, larger 
firms experience lesser impacts after a recall, 
holding everything else constant. For 
example, firms with $11 billon equity (170% 
$4 billion) realize a 0.48% less severe stock 
Table 3. Factors Explaining Stock Price Reactions. 
 
Factor Description Source 
Recall and Firm Related Factors 
Severity (Class) Class I, Class II and Class III FSIS 
Recall Size Number of pounds recalled FSIS 
Foodborne Pathogen Recalls caused by a foodborne pathogen FSIS 
Firm Size Measured as market equity Annual Reports 
Firm’s Experience Firms involved in a food recall within the last year FSIS 
HACCP Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) implementation USDA 
Media Index Number of articles published per recall per day LexisNexis 
Diversification Production/sales segment of meat and poultry products Annual Reports 
Subsidiary Recall issued by a subsidiary Company Website 
Cluster Other recalls within past 10 days FSIS 
Control Factors   
Momentum Return over previous 12 months Bloomberg 
Initial Shock Return on event day Bloomberg 
Trading Volume Percentage of shares outstanding that is traded daily Bloomberg 
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return impact 5 days after a recall event.larger 
than the average firm in our sample of  
Experience has a relatively large 
influence on stock price reactions to recalls.  
Contrary to logic that firms incurring more 
than one recall within the past year might 
reflect more negative impact in stock prices 
as it could reflect sustained damage to 
reputation, the effect of this factor is actually 
positive. Recurrent firms have on average 
about a 1.29% stronger stock price 5 days 
after a recall relative to a firm facing its first 
recall in the past year, holding everything 
else constant. This result is consistent with 
Salin and Hooker (2001). Apparently, 
investors take into consideration the past 
performance of a company when dealing 
with product recalls as they adjust firm 
valuations. When a firm efficiently follows 
the protocols for managing a recall event and 
establishes clear communication channels 
with stakeholders, it sends a good signal to 
the stock market, and investors appear to be 
more comfortable that another recall is not as 
major of a threat as is the first recall in recent 
history. This does not imply that the second 
recall is a net positive event for the company, 
but that the impact of the recall on stock price 
is likely to be less severe.  A firm that 
survived a recent recall event may provide 
confidence to investors that the firm can deal 
effectively with a new recall. 
Media Index has a negative impact in 
stock returns, holding everything else 
constant. For example, one additional recall-
related article published within 5 days after 
the recall announcement, decreases stock 
returns by 0.10%, on average. 
 
Implications 
Several implications for food companies, 
particularly regarding recall management 
arise from our analysis. One implication is 
related to recall size. Firms should try to 
rapidly identify contaminated products, 
perhaps by testing products in smaller lots, so 
that recalls of massive amounts of product are 
less likely. Large recalls are immensely 
costly to the firm and result in sizeable stock 
price impacts which can potentially result in 
firm bankruptcies. Regarding firm size, small 
firms should consider investing more of the 
total firms’ value in food safety technologies 
and protocols as they have greater risk of 
bankruptcy in the event of a recall. 
Another implication is related to the 
firm’s experience, which is more precisely 
measuring the experience that recurrent firms 
have on managing food recalls. Recurrent 
firms appear to have less stock devaluation 
for the same recall compared to firms 
experiencing a recall for the first time.  Firms 
with limited experience handling a food 
recall, can learn from recurrent firms that 
have successfully managed food recalls. 
The implication of media information is 
that once news reaches the public, it will have 
a negative impact on the firm’s market value.  
Therefore, having a plan in place to deal with 
this situation is important. Recommendations 
concerning appropriate strategies for 
managing the influence of media fall outside 
of the scope of our analysis. Nevertheless, 
companies need to be ready to implement 
plans to try to reduce adverse impacts of 
media while dealing with a food recall. 
Finally, since factors such as firm size, 
recall size and media information can 
potentially cause substantial shareholder 
losses, investors may want to know more 
about the firm’s food safety experience and 
strategy before investing. 
Table 4. Effects of Recall and Firm Related factors 
on Stock Price Returns (%). 
Factor 
5-Days  
after 
Recall 
10-Days 
after 
Recall 
15-Days 
after 
Recall 
Class I -0.42  -0.81  -1.06  
Class III 0.86  1.55  1.49  
Recall Size -0.27 * -0.33 * -0.42 * 
Firm Size 0.48 * 0.51  0.40  
Pathogen -0.14  -0.02  0.11  
Experience 1.29 * 1.65 * 1.72 * 
HACCP -0.12  -1.12  -1.43  
Cluster 0.44  0.43  0.24  
Media Index -0.10 * -0.11 * -0.08 * 
Diversification 0.51  0.17  0.01  
Subsidiary -0.39  -0.01  -0.21  
* Indicates that effect is statistically significant at the 0.10 
level. 
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